The discussion about the concept of enlightenment runs through the conception of Immanuel Kant, who thematized it as an exit from the individual from his condition of intellectual minority and guardianship of those who prevent the exercise of thinking for himself, impelling the achievement of autonomy that requires freedom and to make public use of reason. Such problematization about the difficulties interposed to the process of enlightenment can be related to the problem of estrangement in Marx, making the necessary considerations (...) in relation to the historical and social context of both philosophers. In this way, through philosophical investigation, it is possible to establish correlations of complementarities, differences and counterpoints between the different conceptions of Kant and Marx. Thus, we realize that the search for enlightenment depends on overcoming the material determinations of the set of alienations produced by the capitalist mode of production, aiming at the achievement of human emancipation understood as effective autonomous freedom. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo compreender o arquipélago da libertação como umas das chaves de leituras das filosofias negro africanas, neste caso específico, com o recorte da filosofia do moçambicano Severino Elias Ngoenha, desde a leitura do “Paradigma liberdade” em diálogo com a perspectiva do pensamento do arquipélago em diálogo com o martinicano Édouard Glissant. Palavras chave: Filosofias negro africanas; Arquipélago da libertação; Paradigma liberdade; Paisagem.

Several countries maintain universal health coverage, which implies responsibility to organize delivery formats of healthcare services and products for citizens. In Brazil, the health system has a principle of universal access for more than 30 years, but many deficiencies remain and the country observes a day practice for those seeking judicial decisions to determine provision of healthcare.

O Bem-Estar Psicológico (BEP) de estudantes universitários da gradução tem sido objeto de crescente interesse na pesquisa científica por ser reconhecido como uma dimensão multifacetada e central da saúde mental. Nesse sentido, este trabalho propôs-se a apresentar os fatores de risco e os fatores de proteção que influenciam nos índices do BEP, de modo a evidenciar as estratégias eficazes de cuidado em saúde mental para o referido segmento populacional. Metodologicamente, trata-se de uma pesquisa com abordagem qualitativa, a partir de uma (...) revisão integrativa de artigos publicados em português e inglês, disponíveis na íntegra nas bases BVS-Psi e PubMed. Foram utilizados os descritores “bem-estar psicológico”, “universidades” e “saúde mental” ou “bem-estar psicológico”, “fatores de risco” e “fatores de proteção” para BVS-Psi e para PubMed, respectivamente, sendo selecionados e analisados 19 estudos. Os resultados ressaltaram que a sobrecarga de trabalho acadêmico, as expectativas elevadas, a competição intensa e a incerteza em relação ao futuro profissional são fatores de risco. Evidencia-se, ainda, que a criação de relações sociais fortes e de estratégias de gerenciamento do tempo aliadas à orientação profissional eficaz são fatores de proteção que auxiliam na promoção da saúde mental nesta população. (shrink)

Este texto reflete sobre o memoricídio, consequente à presunção racial branca, como vestígio de operações para o genocídio dos corpos e das mentes negras a partir da Peleja de Inácio da Catingueira contra Romano. Sob o jogo discursivo da humilhação, já se encontrava a vontade brutal de destruição de qualquer traço, perspectiva, visão remanescente de saberes e culturas africanas ou descendentes, fossem de cunho material, simbólico, reflexivo, imagético, expressivo, na língua, no corpo. No embate, Inácio, negro, escravizado, já rebaixado sob (...) a égide do sistema escravocrata, embate-se contra a tentativa presunçosa de aniquilamento perpetrada por seu oponente. (shrink)

This article presents the perspective of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on the concept of the State. It is divided into three parts, the first addressing the emergence of the State as a result of the expropriation of the means of production suffered by direct producers, giving rise to private property with the State; the first section also addresses the State in slave and feudal society. The second section explains the functions of the bourgeois state, that is, the attributions of (...) the State which, situated in the capitalist mode of production, represents the wishes of the ruling class; as well as, it points to the illusory form of democracy in the bourgeois State, that limits itself to reforming and does not envisage overcoming it. Finally, the third section treat with the State under the control of the working class, that is, in the period of transition to classless society, and the consequent dissolution of the State after the firmament of this society free from exploiters and exploited. (shrink)

FAMÍLIAS SIMULTÂNEAS: UM DIÁLOGO SÓCIO-JURÍDICO.

PROGRAMA DE AGRESSORES COMO PARTE DA RESPOSTA COORDENADA DA COMUNIDADE – A EXPERIÊNCIA DO GRUPO REFLEXIVO DE HOMENS NO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO DO RIO GRANDE DO NORTE.

En la discusión filosófica sobre la justicia, Amartya Sen, pero también, por ejemplo, Garzón Valdés y el mismo Villoro, sostienen que resulta más urgente alejarnos de la injusticia que concentrarnos en “lo justo”. En este contexto, aquí sostengo que la humillación de la dignidad es precisamente un criterio al que debemos voltear a ver cuando hablamos de lo inaceptable, que es donde inicia la vía negativa hacia la justicia. Para ello, exploro los argumentos de Luis Villoro, Amartya Sen y (...) Martha Nussbaum. Más adelante clarifico el vínculo entre la humillación y la exclusión, para sugerir que en ciertos contextos, y en específico el de la injusticia, el uso del concepto humillación resulta más útil que el de exclusión. (shrink)

HAN, Byung-Chul. Sociedade do cansaço. Vozes, Petrópolis: 2017.

One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his (...) work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

My starting point is what I call the Normative Authority Conception of justification, where S is justified in their belief that p at t (to some degree n) if and only if their believing that p at t is not ruled out by epistemic norms that have normative authority over S at t. With this in mind, this paper develops an account of doxastic justification by first developing an account of the normative authority of epistemic norms. Drawing from work in (...) political philosophy, I argue that (a) the cognitive and evaluative commitments and concerns behind our actual practices of holding each other and ourselves accountable for our beliefs reveal which epistemic norms we have consented to be under, and that (b) it is because we have consented to be under the authority of these norms – by actually holding ourselves and others accountable to them – that they in turn have normative authority over us. By connecting the authority of epistemic norms to the authority we have over ourselves in this way, the resulting account of doxastic justification (i) explains why it can be appropriate to criticize, resent, or sanction someone for having unjustified beliefs, (ii) avoids the phenomena of normative alienation and normative parochialism, and (iii) respects the social and collective nature of epistemic justification. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo pretendo expor sinteticamente os problemas levantados contra uma das formas de realismo científico conhecida como realismo experimental, além de propor uma formulação mais aceitável do mesmo, resistente a tais críticas. Os problemas alegados pelos oponentes do realismo experimental variam desde a acusação de inadequação em relação à prática da comunidade científica, até a inconsistência ao admitir entidades e propriedades postuladas teoricamente recusando, entretanto, as teorias em que tais entidades e propriedades aparecem. Some-se a essas críticas a de (...) que o próprio critério do realismo de entidades seria implausível, seja porque falha na produção de crenças verdadeiras ou porque não fornece garantias melhores do que outras formas de realismo científico. Argumentarei que, adotando o realismo experimental exclusivamente como um critério epistêmico e aplicando tal critério às propriedades é possível contornar as críticas, reabilitando uma proposta realista que muitos consideravam já descartada. ABSTRACT In this paper, I will expose briefly the problems raised against one kind of scientific realism known by experimental realism and also will propose an acceptable formulation of that realism, resistant to those criticisms. The problems claimed by the experimental realism’s opponents range from the accusation of inadequacy with the scientific community’s practice to the claim that the admission of entities and proprieties without accepting the theories in which those proprieties and entities are supposed is incoherent. Besides, there is another criticism which states that the entities realism’s criterion is implausible, either because it fails to produce true beliefs or because there is no better warranty in adopting it than other kinds of scientific realism. I will argue that adopting experimental realism exclusively as an epistemic criterion and applying that criterion to proprieties it is possible to escape the criticisms, rehabilitating a realist propose that many people though already discarded. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

The present paper aims to give an account of pessimistic meta-induction and reply to some representative realist authors who want to consider PMI a fallacy. Most of that accounts are misinterpretations of Laudant’s ideas and fails the target. This work intend that PMI is neither a induction nor a reductio, but a skeptic challenge. If this is right then PMI could not be a fallacy and the realism cannot escape from the task of explain why the success is a good (...) indication for the truthlikeness of the current theories. (shrink)

Lynne Baker was a trenchant critic of reductionist and physicalist conceptions of the universe, as well as the foremost defender of the constitution view of human persons. Baker was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, or what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. And it was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her non-reductionist, constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were given to metaphysical reductionism and eliminativism, born of a penchant (...) for so-called Quinean desert landscapes, Baker was unapologetic and philosophically deft in her defense of ontological pluralism. This volume honors Baker’s work by bringing together 16 critical essays by some of her students, colleagues, interlocutors, and friends. The essays fall into four areas, each an area to which Baker made unique and influential contributions: Practical Realism about the Mind, The Constitution View of Human Persons, The First Person Perspective, and God, Christianity and Naturalism. (shrink)

Aesthetic subjectivism takes the truth of aesthetic judgments to be relative to the individual making that judgment. Despite widespread suspicion, however, this does not mean that one cannot be wrong about such judgments. Accordingly, this does not mean that one cannot gain higher-order evidence of error and fallibility that bears on the rationality of the aesthetic judgment in question. In this paper, we explain and explore these issues in some detail.

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to (...) accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

As a compact representation of joint probability distributions over a dependence graph of random variables, and a tool for modelling and reasoning in the presence of uncertainty, Bayesian networks are of great importance for artificial intelligence to combine domain knowledge, capture causal relationships, or learn from incomplete datasets. Known as a NP-hard problem in a classical setting, Bayesian inference pops up as a class of algorithms worth to explore in a quantum framework. This paper explores such a research direction and (...) improves on previous proposals by a judicious use of the utility function in an entangled configuration. It proposes a completely quantum mechanical decision-making process with a proven computational advantage. A prototype implementation in Qiskit (a Python-based program development kit for the IBM Q machine) is discussed as a proof-of-concept. (shrink)

No presente trabalho procurarei expor dois desafios antirrealistas ancorados na história da ciência, que Stanford apelidou respectivamente de ‘antiga’ e ‘nova indução pessimista’. Argumentarei que existe uma solução realista já disponível a ambos os desafios pessimistas: o realismo experimental, inicialmente proposto por Hacking e Cartwritght, segundo o qual é possível comprometer-se com entidades teóricas com as quais desenvolvemos interações causais e com as quais produzimos fenômenos controlados, sem que tal compromisso se estenda às teorias mesmas. Tomarei como parâmetro não propriamente (...) os argumentos de Hacking e Cartwright que sofrem inúmeras críticas, mas uma formulação sofisticada do realismo experimental proposta por Egg. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

This is not a guide for your writing process. You should write in whatever way expressing and making sense of your ideas feels most natural and most productive to you. This is a guide for organizing your ideas, after you have captured some of them in fits and starts of prose, into a particular kind of final product: the basic philosophy paper.

Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...) (Fricker 2007, 5). In this paper, however, I identify different means by which our hermeneutic activities lead to social injustices, of both a practical and epistemic kind, and I identify different ways in which those injustices manifest themselves. Since Fricker’s use of the notion of “hermeneutical injustices” to denote a well-defined kind of injustice is rightfully well-established, I here refer to the more general kinds of injustices I have in mind as “hermeneutic injustices” instead. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)